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INTRODUCTION
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ("Farm
Bill") runs contrary to the letter of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") agreements and the spirit of ongoing WTO negotiations.1
When Congress passed the Farm Bill, it represented a fundamental
change in the U.S. government's stance on agricultural subsidies.2
1. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 §§ 1101-1108, 7
U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7918 (West Supp. 2005) (embodying anti-free trade agricultural
policy); see also discussion infra Part II (demonstrating that the Farm Bill is
inconsistent with WTO agreements and ideals).
2. See Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 §§ 101-115,
7 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7215 (2000) (enacting limits on domestic agricultural subsidies
and lessening their adverse effects on global trade in agriculture by decoupling
payments from price and production levels); Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act §§ 1101-1108 (supplementing the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act by implementing direct subsidies and counter-cyclical payments
without specifying limits on the amount of funds the Secretary of Agriculture can
allocate to individual agricultural producers); see also 148 CONG. REC. S4028
(daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bunning) (stating that the Farm Bill
"1reflects a fundamental shift in federal agriculture policy" and undermines the
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The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
("Freedom to Farm Act") 3 eliminated some government subsidies4
and caused U.S. trade-distorting domestic support to remain well
below the amount permitted under the WTO's Agreement on
Agriculture.5 However, the Farm Bill resurrected much of the
progress of the 1996 agriculture law). Senator McConnell asserted that the Farm
Bill "sets U.S. agriculture policy back 10 years." Id. at S4029; see also 148 CONG.
REC. E778 (daily ed. May 10, 2002) (statement of Rep. Biggert) (refusing to
support the Farm Bill because it reflects a shift in principles from the 1996
Freedom to Farm Act). See generally Dangerous Activities: Trade Disputes,
ECONOMIST, May 11, 2002 (explaining that the Farm Bill reintroduced a host of
trade-distorting subsidies for U.S. farmers, which unraveled the progress made by
the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996), available at
LEXIS, News Library, ECON File; David E. Sanger, Reversing Course, Bush
Signs Bill Raising Farm Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2002, at A16 (contrasting
the Farm Bill, which increased domestic subsidies by $83 billion over a ten-year
period for a total of $190 billion, with the Freedom to Farm Act, through which
lawmakers intended to decrease government payments to agricultural producers),
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
3. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 § 115
(amending the Food Security Act of 1985, specifying that "payment limitations,"
such as the total amount of direct payments to farmers, cannot exceed $40,000 per
producer per year).
4. See 148 CONG. REC. E778 (daily ed. May 10, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Biggert) (maintaining that the Freedom to Farm Act was an effort to gradually
lessen farmers' support on domestic subsidies and allow the market to "dictate
prices and production levels"); see also 148 CONG. REC. S4028 (daily ed. May 8,
2002) (statement of Sen. Bunning) (documenting that the Freedom to Farm Act
moved U.S. agriculture policy toward a free-market approach by diminishing
subsidies and giving farmers the "flexibility to plant crops that would allow them
to make a decent living").
5. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410
[hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture] (providing an agreement among WTO
Member States to reduce the amount of domestic subsidies each Member provides
to its agricultural producers), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e
/legal-e/14-ag.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005); id. art. 6(3) (limiting U.S. spending
on trade-distorting agricultural subsidies to $19.1 billion per year); see also Clete
D. Johnson, Note, A Barren Harvest for the Developing World? Presidential
"Trade Promotion Authority" and the Unfulfilled Promise of Agriculture
Negotiations in the Doha Round, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 437, 456 (2004)
(reporting that the Freedom to Farm Act reduced trade-distorting subsidies so that
the U.S. Total Aggregate Measure of Support in 1998 was only $10.4 billion);
Dangerous Activities, supra note 2 (explaining that the Freedom to Farm Act's
phasing out of trade-distorting subsidies kept the United States well within the
$19.1 billion limit, and that U.S. Total AMS was likely to decrease more under the
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domestic subsidies and likely will result in the United States
violating the Agreement on Agriculture.6 In essence, the Farm Bill
requires the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") to
allocate subsidies to producers of certain crops in the form of "direct
payments," in which the payment amount depends on the quantity of
the crop the producer planted at some point in the past.7 The Farm
Bill also provides for "counter-cyclical payments," which the USDA
distributes in addition to direct payments when crop prices fall.8
The WTO's Agreement on Agriculture, a product of the Uruguay
Round of trade talks in 1994, aims to curb trade-distorting domestic
Act); Frederick Nelson, U.S. Ag Policy - Well Below WTO Ceilings on Domestic
Support, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1997, at 26-32 (listing actual and projected U.S.
Total AMS under the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act, as well as under the limits
imposed by the Agreement on Agriculture), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/agoutlook/octl997/ao245h.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
6. See 148 CONG. REc. S4137 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (asserting that the Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments will encourage
overproduction and drive down prices, which will lead to more subsidies and may
cause the United States to breach the Agreement on Agriculture); see also Gregor
Kreuzhuber, Questions & Answers - US Farm Bill (May 15, 2002) (expecting the
Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments to cause a breach of U.S. obligations under
the Agreement on Agriculture), available through http://www.agricultural
convention.org/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2005); Congress at the Trough, CHI. TRIB,
May 6, 2002, at 14 (arguing that the Farm Bill's subsidies will cause
overproduction, which in turn will cause trade distortion), available at LEXIS,
News Library, CHTRIB File; Dangerous Activities, supra note 2 (maintaining that
the Farm Bill puts the United States at risk of breaking its commitments under the
Agreement on Agriculture and that "America's commitment to freer trade looks
laughable"); discussion infra Part II.A (demonstrating how the Farm Bill's
counter-cyclical payments likely violate the Agreement on Agriculture because
they cause overproduction and price suppression and are prone to expansion,
thereby causing trade distortion and putting the United States at risk of spending
more than the Agreement allows).
7. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1103, 7 U.S.C.A. §§
7901-7918 (West Supp. 2005) (providing that the Secretary of Agriculture must
give direct payments to producers whose farms have set payment amounts and
base acres); see also discussion infra Part I.A. 1 (explaining the fundamentals of the
direct payment system under the 2002 Farm Bill).
8. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1104 (specifying that the
USDA must distribute counter-cyclical payments for a commodity if it determines
that the commodity's target price exceeds its effective price); see also discussion
infra Part I.A.2 (summarizing the purpose and method of counter-cyclical payment
distribution).
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subsidies.9 Trade distortion occurs in the market when an agricultural
producer's level of production or a commodity's price is higher or
lower than it would be absent government interference. 10
Government payments to farmers that depend on the amount of crops
the farmer produces or a crop's market price tend to cause
overproduction of those commodities. 1 The surplus saturates the
world market for that commodity, drives prices down, and adversely
affects the producers of that commodity in other parts of the world.1
2
The Agreement on Agriculture limits the United States to spending a
maximum of $19.1 billion per year on trade-distorting agricultural
subsidies. 3 In addition to Agreement on Agriculture restrictions, the
9. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 6 (providing that WTO
Members must temper domestic support initiatives).
10. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 26 (2003)
[hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO] (describing what trade distortion is, what
causes it, and its common effects), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/whatise/tife/understanding-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
11. See id. at 28 (explaining that measures that bolster local prices or support
production levels can lead to overproduction); see also Daniel T. Griswold, Farm
Bill Follies, Presentation at Cato Institute Policy Forum (June 6, 2002)
(maintaining that subsidies guaranteeing prices cause production levels to remain
steady when the market indicates that production should fall), at
http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/speeches/dg-060602.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2005).
12. See 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Bunning) (remarking that the Farm Bill's production incentives will result in
subsidized crop overproduction, causing world prices of those commodities to
fall); see also UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10, at 28 (stipulating that the
overproduction of commodities results in dumping of low-priced goods on the
international market, which hurts developing countries); Daniel Altman, Global
Trade Looking Glass: Can US. Have It Both Ways?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at
C l (observing that critics of the Farm Bill predict that it will persuade farmers to
overproduce, which in turn will weaken world prices for the overproduced goods),
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
13. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 6(3) (providing that a
WTO Member State meets its domestic support reduction obligations if its
agricultural domestic subsidies in any one year, measured as the Current Total
Aggregate Measurement of Support ("Current Total AMS"), do not surpass the
maximum amount); see also Press Conference, U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick, USTR Zoellick Discusses the Successful Conclusion of Meetings of the
WTO's General Council in Geneva, Switzerland (Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter
Zoellick Press Conference], at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
Transcripts/2004/August/Transcript-of PressConferencewithUSTRZoellick_
At theConclusion of WTOGeneralCouncilMeeting,_Geneva,_Switzerl.html
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Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM
Agreement") invalidates subsidies that cause serious prejudice to the
interests of any WTO Member.' 4 A WTO panel recently ruled that
U.S. cotton subsidies violate the SCM Agreement and suggested that
all counter-cyclical payments under the Farm Bill are illegal.'5
Since enacting the Agreement on Agriculture, the WTO has begun
a new round of trade talks, the Doha Round, aimed at further
reducing trade-distorting subsidies and tariffs. '6 However, the Round
has been seriously delayed, partly because of the United States'
insistence on maintaining its Farm Bill subsidies." Recently, in
(last visited Sept. 9, 2005); Johnson, supra note 5, at 454-55 (clarifying that the
ceiling of $19.1 billion per year means that the United States has agreed to limit its
Current Total AMS to this amount).
14. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art.
5, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement] (stating that WTO Member
States may not allow subsidies to injure "the domestic industry of another
Member" or strongly influence another Member's interests), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/24-scm.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
15. See Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, at 350-51,
WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies]
(requiring the United States to "remove the adverse effects" of its counter-cyclical
payments to cotton producers or withdraw them altogether), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/267r-ae.pdf (last visited Sept. 9,
2005).
16. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, 13, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Declaration] (reaffirming the Uruguay Round's commitment to "correct and
prevent restrictions and distortions" in global agricultural trade), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0 le/mindecl-e.pdf (last
visited Sept. 9, 2005). The declaration provided that the Doha Round's goals are
"substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing
out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support." Id.
17. See Cancun's Charming Outcome: Breakdown in Cancun, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 20, 2003 (outlining the purpose of the Doha Trade Round, discussing the
breakdown of talks in Cancun, Mexico, and analyzing its likely impact on global
trade), available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File. The original deadline for
reaching an agreement in the Doha Round was January 1, 2005, but the failure of
negotiations in September 2003 at the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in
Cancun, Mexico greatly reduced the chance of meeting this goal. Id.; see also
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10, at 91 (describing the division among
WTO Members over agricultural issues at the ministerial conference in Cancun on
September 10-14, 2003); The WTO Under Fire - The Doha Round, ECONOMIST,
1216 [20:1211
2005] REPEAL OF FARM BILL OF 2002 1217
Geneva, Switzerland, WTO Members made an agreement to adhere
to certain principles in continuing Doha Round negotiations. 8 That
decision included a framework ("Geneva Framework") to provide an
underlying structure for a Doha Round agreement on agriculture.1 9
The Farm Bill cannot withstand the provisions of the Geneva
Framework and thus almost certainly will violate a final Doha Round
agreement based on the Framework. 0
Sept. 20, 2003 (opining that the collapse at Cancun puts multilateral trade
negotiations in peril and negates any possibility of the WTO achieving consensus
by the original deadline), available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File. The
Economist attributed the blame for the breakdown of negotiations to both the rich
and poor countries. Id. For instance, the United States was unwilling to curb its
cotton subsidies, and many of the poorest countries made demands on the rich
countries while doing nothing to lower their own trade barriers. Id.
18. See WTO Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General
Council § 3, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Doha Decision] (calling on all
WTO Member States to focus their efforts on reaching a final Doha Round
agreement and promulgating a framework for agricultural and nonagricultural
market access negotiations), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/dda e/ddadraft 31jul04 e.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005). The Doha
Decision specified that the new deadline for completion of negotiations is
December 2005 at the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China.
Id.; see also Press Release, World Trade Org., Supachai Welcomes Input from the
Five as a Key First Step (July 29, 2004) [hereinafter Input from the Five] (noting
that ministers from the United States, E.U., Australia, Brazil, and India met in
Geneva from July 28-29, 2004, and agreed on some preliminary matters regarding
a new agriculture agreement), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/news04_e/dda-package-sum-28-29july04_e.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2005); Press Release, World Trade Org., Round-the-Clock Meetings Produce
"Historic" Breakthrough (July 31, 2004) [hereinafter Historic Breakthrough]
(explaining that the WTO's 147 countries approved the Doha Decision in the early
morning of Aug. 1, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/
news04_e/dda packagesum_3 ljulyO4_e.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
19. See WTO Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General
Council, Annex A: Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, at A-1,
WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Geneva Framework] (calling for an
abolition of all export subsidies, a substantial reduction in trade-distorting
domestic subsidies, and lower tariffs to improve market access), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ddae/ddadraft_31julO4_e.pdf (last visited
Sept. 9, 2005).
20. See discussion infra Part II.B (demonstrating that the Farm Bill violates
those provisions of the Geneva Framework that require a twenty percent decrease
in allowable trade-distorting subsidies, reductions on blue box subsidies, and caps
on product-specific support).
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
This Comment argues that Congress should repeal the Farm Bill
and enact legislation that is consistent with the Agreement on
Agriculture and the Geneva Framework.2' Part I details relevant
provisions of the Farm Bill, the Agreement on Agriculture, the
Geneva Framework, and the WTO's recent decision on the legality
of U.S. cotton subsidies regulated under the Farm Bill.22 Part II
applies the Agreement on Agriculture and the Geneva Framework to
the Farm Bill and concludes that the legislation is inconsistent with
these multilateral agreements.23 Part III argues that Congress should
repeal the Farm Bill because it violates world trade agreements.24
Furthermore, Part III recommends that Congress enact a new
agriculture law that is founded upon free-market principles and
awards subsidies based on farmers' compliance with environmental
measures instead of their production levels.
I. BACKGROUND
The Farm Bill requires the Secretary of Agriculture to distribute
domestic subsidies to farmers in the form of direct and counter-
cyclical payments.26 However, the Agreement on Agriculture
21. See discussion infra Part III (suggesting that Congress should repeal the
Farm Bill for several legal and policy reasons and implement an agriculture bill
dedicated to free market principles that rewards farmers for conservation
measures).
22. See discussion infra Part I (providing background on the Farm Bill's direct
and counter-cyclical payments, the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture and
the Geneva Framework relevant to the Farm Bill, and the WTO's decision to
declare U.S. cotton subsidies illegal).
23. See discussion infra Part II (finding that the Farm Bill's counter-cyclical
payments, but not its direct payments, likely violate the Agreement on Agriculture
and the Geneva Framework).
24. See discussion infra Part III.A (recommending that Congress repeal the
Farm Bill because it violates the Agreement on Agriculture and the Geneva
Framework and hurts both domestic and international agricultural producers in the
long term).
25. See discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting that the United States model a
new farm bill after an E.U. policy that farmers should have income stability linked
to their participation in environmental and conservational programs).
26. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1103, 7 U.S.C.A. §
7913 (West Supp. 2005) (explaining the availability of direct payments to
farmers). The Farm Bill also requires distribution of counter-cyclical payments to
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restricts each Member State's allowable spending on trade-distorting
domestic agriculture subsidies.27 In 2003, Brazil brought a complaint
to the WTO that U.S. cotton subsidies, which are regulated under the
Farm Bill, breach the Agreement on Agriculture, and a WTO panel
issued a ruling largely in favor of Brazil in September 2004.28 On
August 1, 2004, WTO Members agreed to a framework that calls for
further reductions in domestic subsidies, which will serve as the
basis for a new WTO agriculture agreement.29
A. PROVISIONS OF THE FARM BILL OF 2002
1. Direct Payments
The direct payment system mandates that the Secretary of
Agriculture subsidize every farmer whose crops fall within the Farm
Bill's coverage and who can establish that he planted and harvested
those crops in the past.30 The amount of a direct payment subsidy that
a farmer who produces a covered crop will receive is the product of
(1) the "payment acres" of the crop the farmer planted, (2) the
amount of crop that those acres yielded, known as the "payment
yield," and (3) a pre-specified amount of money the U.S. government
will pay for each unit of crop produced, the crop's "payment rate."3
agricultural producers of certain commodities that depend on crop production
levels and market prices. Id. § 1104.
27. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 6 (requiring each State to
reduce its permitted levels of spending on trade-distorting domestic support); see
also UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10, at 28-29 (specifying that
developed countries agreed to reduce the maximum amount that they may spend
on trade-distorting domestic subsidies by twenty percent over six years).
28. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 1 (stating that
Brazil requested that a WTO panel investigate its allegation that U.S. subsidies to
upland cotton producers violated the Agreement on Agriculture). The Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") Panel found that some U.S. cotton subsidies are heavily
trade-distorting and prejudicial to Brazil's interests. Id. at 349-50.
29. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, § 18 (providing that a new
agreement will contain an abolition on export subsidies and significant reductions
in trade-distorting domestic subsidies and tariffs).
30. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1103 (requiring the
Secretary of Agriculture to make direct payments to farmers during the years of
2002-2007 for the crops the agreement covers).
31. Id. § 1103(c). Payment rates during 2002-2007 for the commodities
covered by the Farm Bill are: (1) wheat at $0.52 per bushel; (2) corn at $0.28 per
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Payment acres are the number of acres equal to eighty-five percent of
the actual acres of crop planted.32 The payment yield for a crop under
the direct payment system equals the amount of the crop the farmer
produced in 1995, as opposed to the year when the farmer actually
receives the subsidy. 33
2. Counter-Cyclical Payments
The purpose behind the counter-cyclical payment system is to
provide additional assistance to farmers when the demand for their
crops has decreased and prices are low. 34 Accordingly, the Farm Bill
requires the Secretary of Agriculture to distribute counter-cyclical
payments if a crop's "effective price," or market price, has fallen
bushel; (3) grain sorghum at $0.35 per bushel; (4) barley at $0.24 per bushel; (5)
oats at $0.024 per bushel; (6) upland cotton at $0.0667 per pound; (7) rice at $2.35
per hundredweight; (8) soybeans at $0.44 per bushel; and (9) other oilseeds at
$0.0080 per pound). Id. § 1103(b).
32. See id. § 1101(f) (defining payment acres in terms of base acres, or actual
acres planted). An agricultural producer may select one of the following two
methods for the Secretary to use in calculating the base acres of a crop: (1) the
four-year average of the acreage of the crop planted during 1998-2001 plus the
four-year average of any acreage on the farm that the farmer could not plant due to
conditions beyond his control, such as a draught or flood; or (2) the sum of the
acreage the Secretary of Agriculture used to distribute a payment in 2002 under the
Freedom to Farm Act. Id. § 1101(a)(1)(A)-(B). However, if the farmer produces an
oilseed crop, then the crop's number of base acres must equal the four-year
average of eligible oilseed acreage on the farm during the 1998-2001 crop years.
Id. § 1l01(a)(1)(B)(ii).
33. See id. § 1102(b) (specifying that the payment yield of a crop for purposes
of calculating a direct payment equals the yield of that crop in the 1995 harvest
year). If a farm did not produce a certain crop in 1995 that the Farm Bill covers,
then the Secretary will assign a payment yield to the crop according to the payment
yield for that crop in 1995 on similar farms. Id. § 1102(c).
34. See id. § 1104 (explaining the conditions under which the USDA must
distribute additional subsidies in the form of counter-cyclical payments); see also
Altman, supra note 12 (expressing that the Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments
protect farmers from slumps in the business cycle, which critics say encourages
farmers to overproduce); Press Release, White House, President Signs Farm Bill
(May 13, 2002) [hereinafter President Signs Farm Bill] (contending that the Bill
provides extra assistance to farmers "when times are tough"), at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020513-2.html (last visited Sept. 9,
2005).
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below a pre-determined "target price" for that crop.35 If the Secretary
determines that a commodity's market price is too low, then he or
she will distribute counter-cyclical subsidies to farmers in an amount
that is equal to the product of (1) the number of payment acres of the
crop, (2) the payment yield of the crop, and (3) the payment rate for
the crop, which is the difference between the effective and target
prices.36 The Secretary calculates payment acres in the same way as
under the direct payment system, which provides that they are equal
to eighty-five percent of the actual acres of crops planted.37 However,
calculation of the payment yield of a crop differs for counter-cyclical
payments due to the producers' option to "partially update" their
payment yields to reflect crop production in 1998-2001 as opposed to
crop production in 1995, which is used to calculate direct
payments. 38 This difference is significant because it demonstrates
35. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1104(a) (illustrating that the
purpose behind the counter-cyclical payments is to compensate for market
fluctuations). The "effective price" of a crop is the payment rate for the purpose of
making direct payments with respect to that crop plus the higher of the following:
(1) the national average market price during the twelve month marketing year for
the crop, or (2) the national average loan rate for a marketing assistance loan for
the covered commodity. Id. § 1104(b). The target prices for covered crops from
2004-2007 are as follows: (1) wheat at $3.92 per bushel; (2) corn at $2.63 per
bushel; (3) grain sorghum at $2.57 per bushel; (4) barley at $2.24 per bushel; (5)
oats at $1.44 per bushel; (6) upland cotton at $0.7240 per pound; (7) rice at $10.50
per hundredweight; (8) soybeans at $5.80 per bushel; and (9) other oilseeds at
$0.1010 per pound. Id.
36. See id. § 1104(e) (promulgating the recommended formula to use in
determining the amount of a counter-cyclical payment). Payment rates and,
therefore, the amount of counter-cyclical payments, depend on market fluctuations.
Id. § 1104(d).
37. See id. § 1 l01(a)-(f) (specifying how the Secretary calculates base acres
and payment acres for both direct payments and counter-cyclical payments).
38. See id. § 1102(b) (describing "payment yield" for a covered crop for
purposes of direct and counter-cyclical payments as the amount of the crop
produced in 1995); see also id. § 1102(e) (allowing producers to partially update
the crop yields for purposes of counter-cyclical payments). The Farm Bill provides
two methods a producer may use in calculating an updated payment yield for a
crop. Id. § 11 02(e)(3). First, an updated yield can be equal to the sum of (a) the
payment yield applicable to direct payments, and (b) seventy percent of the
difference between the payment yield for direct payments and the average yield per
planted acre of the crop during the 1998-2001 crop years. Id. § 1102(e)(3)(A).
Second, a farmer can choose an updated crop payment yield as equal to ninety-
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that counter-cyclical payments take into account much more recent
crop production levels than direct payments. 9
B. THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
The Agreement on Agriculture is one component of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed in
April 1994.4" The Agreement on Agriculture's long-range goal is "to
establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system."41
The Agreement sets forth specific goals of expanding market access
by requiring reduction of tariffs, decreasing the amount of and
expenditures on subsidized exports, and reducing Members'
spending on trade-distorting domestic subsidies.42
Article Six of the Agreement on Agriculture, which discusses
domestic support commitments, mandates that each WTO Member
State must not provide trade-distorting domestic subsidies to its
agricultural producers in excess of a maximum amount that is
specific to each State.43 The maximum amount of funds that the
three and one-half percent of the average yield per planted acre of the crop over the
1998-2001 crop years. Id. § 1102(e)(3)(B).
39. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (explaining that using more current
production levels in calculating counter-cyclical payments contributes to the trade-
distorting character of these subsidies).
40. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (establishing
a single institution to govern international trade, which encompasses the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and many other agreements), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
41. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, pmbi. (stating further that the
Agreement's long-term objectives aim to reduce and prevent restrictions in
international trade and measures that distort world agricultural markets).
42. See id. (specifying that the parties to the Agreement have committed to
improving market access and reducing domestic support and export competition);
see also Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
433, 452-53 (2002) (providing an overview of the major provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture); UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10, at 29-31
(explaining the basic reduction commitments contained in the Agreement).
43. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 6(3) (stating that a
Member State remains in compliance with the Agreement so long as its Current
Total AMS does not exceed the country's "final bound commitment level"). The
sum of a country's domestic support to agricultural producers constitutes that
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United States may spend on trade-distorting agricultural subsidies
under the Agreement on Agriculture is $19.1 billion.' The total
amount of trade-distorting support that the U.S. government actually
distributes in a year is termed its Current Total Aggregate
Measurement of Support ("Current Total AMS").45 To comply with
the Agreement on Agriculture, the U.S. Current Total AMS must be
less than the Allowed Total Aggregate Measurement of Support
("Allowed Total AMS") of $19.1 billion per year.46
The WTO divides subsidies into different "boxes" in order to
illustrate the amount of relative trade distortion the subsidies cause.47
The agricultural subsidies that are the most trade-distorting are called
country's "Total Aggregate Measurement of Support," or "Total AMS," and the
sum of domestic support that a country provides during any one year is called
"Current Total AMS." Id. art. 1(h). A Member State calculates its final bound
commitment level in relation to the country's "Base Total AMS," which is the total
amount of trade-distorting agricultural subsidies the country allocated to its
producers during the base period of 1986-88. Id. Annex 3; see also
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10, at 28-29 (clarifying that developed
countries agreed to reduce trade-distorting domestic subsidies by twenty percent
over six years, using the amount of domestic support the countries provided in
1986-1988 as base years).
44. See Zoellick Press Conference, supra note 13; see also World Trade Org.,
Agriculture Negotiations: Background Fact Sheet, Domestic Support in
Agriculture [hereinafter Domestic Support Boxes] (providing that a country's
maximum amount of permitted subsidies is also known as its Allowed Total
Aggregate Measurement of Support), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
agric-e/agboxes-e.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
45. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 6(3) (defining Current
Total AMS as a country's total amount of trade-distorting domestic support
measures allocated to agricultural producers in a given year); see also Gonzalez,
supra note 42, at 457 (explaining that Current Total AMS provides the measure of
a country's compliance with the Agreement on Agriculture).
46. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, Annex 3 (detailing the
method by which a country must calculate its Current Total AMS); see also
Zoellick Press Conference, supra note 13 (specifying that the U.S. Allowed Total
AMS equals approximately $19.1 billion per year).
47. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 6 (distinguishing
subsidies that Member States do not have to reduce from those that count towards
a country's Allowed Total AMS); see also Domestic Support Boxes, supra note 44
(facilitating an understanding of the Agreement on Agriculture by characterizing
subsidies as falling into different boxes).
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"amber box" supports.48 "Blue box" supports are less trade-distorting
than amber box subsidies because they require recipients of the
subsidy to limit the amount of crops they produce. 9 In contrast to
amber and blue box supports, "green box" subsidies have minimal or
no trade-distorting effects." The Agreement on Agriculture does not
require Member States to reduce the amount of any domestic
subsidies except for amber box subsidies,5 which are the only
subsidies that count toward a Member State's spending limit.5 2 Since
the U.S. Allowed Total AMS is $19.1 billion, the total amount of
amber box support the United States may spend is also $19.1
billion. 3
48. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 6(4) (specifying that the
most trade-distorting domestic subsidies, with certain de minimis exceptions, fall
into the amber box). Trade-distorting subsidies are de minimis and, therefore, do
not fall into the amber box when (1) product-specific domestic support does not
exceed five percent of the total value of production of that specific product during
the relevant year, and (2) non-product-specific support amounts to no greater than
five percent of the value of the Member's total agricultural production. Id.
49. See id. art. 6(5) (recognizing an exception for trade-distorting subsidies that
require agricultural producers to limit production). These blue box supports, which
do not count toward a Member State's limit, are "[d]irect payments under
production-limiting programmes" that also are (1) based on fixed area and yields,
(2) made on eighty-five percent or less of the base level of production, or (3)
livestock payments that are made on a fixed number. Id.
50. See id. Annex 2. A subsidy falls into the green box if it (1) comes from a
publicly-funded government program not involving transfers from consumers, and
(2) does not have the effect of providing price support to producers. Id.
51. See Domestic Support Boxes, supra note 44 (explaining that Members
must reduce "amber box" subsidies but do not have to reduce "blue box" or "green
box" subsidies). Each WTO Member State may spend a fixed amount of amber
box support on its agriculture producers. See id.
52. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 455 (noting that amber box subsidies count
against a Member State's Allowed Total AMS); see also Domestic Support Boxes,
supra note 44 (demonstrating that a Member's Current Total AMS represents the
amount of amber box subsidies that the Member has spent).
53. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 454-55 (explaining that a limit of $19.1
billion per year means that the United States has agreed to limit its Current Total
AMS to this amount); see also Zoellick Press Conference, supra note 13.
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C. THE WTO RULING ON U.S. COTTON SUBSIDIES
AND THE SCM AGREEMENT
In September 2002, Brazil filed a complaint with the WTO
Dispute Settlement Board ("DSB") 54 alleging that U.S. cotton
subsidies, which are regulated under the Farm Bill, are heavily trade-
distorting and violate WTO agreements. 55 The Agreement on
Agriculture includes a "peace clause," which states that during the
implementation period of the Agreement, a WTO Member may not
file a complaint regarding another Member State's domestic
subsidies unless the State has spent more on subsidies for a given
commodity per year than the State spent on subsidies for that
commodity during the 1992 marketing year. 56 First, Brazil contended
54. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, art. 6, 33 I.L.M. 1225, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute
Settlement Understanding] (establishing that if a Member requests that a panel
review a matter, the DSB may elect to establish a panel at its next meeting),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf (last visited
Sept. 9, 2005).
55. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 1-2
(describing Brazil's allegation that U.S. subsidies on upland cotton were in
violation of the Agreement on Agriculture, the SCM Agreement, and other WTO
agreements). The Brazil Government requested consultation with the U.S.
government in September 2002 regarding certain subsidies provided to U.S.
producers, users, and exporters of upland cotton and the laws governing those
subsidies. Id. at 1. The two governments met for several consultations but were
unable to settle the dispute. Id. Therefore, Brazil requested that the WTO establish
a DSB Panel to examine the matter pursuant to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, Article 6, and the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 19. Id. at 1;
see also Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 19 (providing that the
Dispute Settlement Understanding governs the settlement of disputes under this
Agreement). See generally Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2004
(documenting that Brazil was the first WTO Member to challenge a rich country's
agriculture subsidies), available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/
displaystory.cflm?story-id=2626900 (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
56. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, art. 13(b)(iii) (stating that
domestic support measures that fully conform to the Agreement shall receive
exemption from actions filed by other Members "provided that such measures do
not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992
marketing year"); see also Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
WTO Panel Issues Mixed Verdict in Cotton Case (Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter
Mixed Verdict] (describing that the purpose of the peace clause was to prevent
WTO Members from challenging subsidy measures during the Agreement on
Agriculture's implementation period), at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary
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that the peace clause does not exempt U.S. domestic subsidies on
cotton from a challenge because the United States has spent more on
cotton subsidies in recent years than it spent in 1992.17 Second,
Brazil alleged that U.S. cotton subsidies violate the SCM Agreement
because they have caused, and continued to cause, "serious
prejudice" to Brazil's interests by depressing world markets for
upland cotton.18 The United States maintained that the Farm Bill's
payments to cotton producers are immune from attack because they
do not exceed levels of cotton subsidies provided to farmers in 1992
and, in any case, do not cause serious prejudice to Brazil's interests.5 9
/PressReleases/2004/September/WTOPanel_IssuesMixedVerdict inCotton_
Case_printer.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
57. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 2-3
(expressing Brazil's request that the DSB Panel find that U.S. domestic support
measures for upland cotton during the 1999-2002 marketing years violated the
Agreement on Agriculture under the authority of the peace clause); see also A
Knotty Problem: America and the WTO, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004 (reporting that
Brazil filed a formal complaint against the United States in September 2002,
alleging that U.S. cotton subsides are not immune from challenge under the peace
clause), available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File.
58. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 3 (urging the
DSB Panel to find that the subsidies cause suppression of upland cotton prices in
the U.S., Brazilian, and world markets, and that this constitutes serious prejudice to
Brazil's interests in violation of SCM Articles 5(c) and 6.3). Brazil also claimed
that the subsidies cause the United States to have a market share in upland cotton
that causes serious prejudice to Brazil's interests in violation of the SCM
Agreement. Id. at 4; see also SCM Agreement, supra note 14, art. 5(c) (providing
that no Member State may allow its subsidies to cause serious prejudice to the
interests of another Member). Article 6.3 describes situations that constitute
"serious prejudice." Id. art. 6.3.
59. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 6-7
(contending that U.S. cotton supports are exempt from legal challenge because
they fall within the parameters of the peace clause). The United States submitted
that, if the Panel found that the subsidies do not meet the criteria of the peace
clause, the subsidies are only minimally trade-distorting and, therefore, do not
unfairly prejudice Brazil. Id.; see also Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, supra note 55
(explaining the U.S. position that cotton farmers receive counter-cyclical payments
according to the number of acres planted and the amount of cotton produced in the
past and, therefore, do not tempt farmers to overproduce and consequently depress
world prices for cotton).
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The investigating DSB Panel concluded that U.S. cotton subsidies
are not exempt from challenge under the peace clause.60
Furthermore, the Panel agreed with Brazil in finding that U.S.
counter-cyclical payments to cotton producers violate the SCM
Agreement because they cause significant price suppression and
serious prejudice to Brazil's interests. 6' As a remedy, the DSB Panel
required the United States to remove the subsidies' adverse effects or
withdraw them altogether.62 The current general consensus in the
WTO is that the peace clause has expired, so a Member challenging
U.S. subsidies in the future probably would not have to show that the
United States spends more on subsidies for the crop in question than
it spent in 1992.63
60. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 348 (ruling
that U.S. cotton subsidies during the marketing years 1999-2002 exceeded the
amount of subsidies the United States distributed during the 1992 marketing year);
see also Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, supra note 55 (reporting that the United
States paid cotton producers $1.62 billion in 1992, in contrast to $2.3 billion in
1999 and $2.06 billion in 2001).
61. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 349 (finding
that "mandatory price-contingent United States subsidy measures" on upland
cotton, such as counter-cyclical payments, cause serious prejudice to Brazil in
violation of Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement). However, the Panel
decided that Brazil failed to establish that U.S. direct payments to cotton producers
cause significant price suppression in the world agriculture market. Id. at 349-50.
Additionally, Brazil did not adequately prove that the counter-cyclical payments
significantly increase the U.S. world market share of cotton in violation of the
SCM Agreement. Id.
62. See id. at 350-51 (demanding, pursuant to Article 7.8 of the SCM
Agreement, that the United States implement remedial measures to correct the
prejudice the subsidies have caused); see also Mixed Verdict, supra note 56
(quoting former U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick as saying that the United
States strongly disagrees with some aspects of the WTO ruling, such as the finding
that U.S. domestic cotton subsidies distort trade by depressing world cotton prices,
and that the United States will appeal); Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, supra note 55
(recognizing that the ruling is not final and the United States plans to appeal). Even
if the Appellate Body confirms the ruling, the United States may act slowly in
implementing the Panel's recommendations. Id.
63. See Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, supra note 55 (reporting that most WTO
countries agree that the peace clause has expired). The Economist found that the
"legal cover" protecting rich countries' subsidies no longer exists with the peace
clause's expiration. Id.
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D. THE GENEVA FRAMEWORK
The Geneva Framework represents a consensus among the WTO
Member States as to the general provisions the new agreement on
agriculture will entail. 6 Although it leaves many details for further
negotiation, the Framework calls for substantial reductions in trade-
distorting domestic subsidies by all Members." Under the
Framework, wealthy countries like the United States and the
European Union ("E.U.") agreed to reduce their Allowed Total AMS
levels by twenty percent during the first year following a final Doha
Round agreement. 66 Also, the Framework stipulates that countries
64. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, 6, 17, 29 (calling for an
abolition of all export subsidies, substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic
subsidies, and decreases in tariffs to improve market access); see also Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Charting a Course to Prosperity: WTO
Agrees on a Detailed Plan to Open Markets, Expand Trade (July 31, 2004)
(outlining the substance of the Geneva Framework and explaining that the
Framework proposes caps on support levels for specific commodities as well as
cuts in overall levels of trade-distorting support), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library/Fact Sheets/2004/asset-uploadfile
505_5635.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005). See generally Now Harvest It: World
Trade, ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2004 (noting that the Geneva Framework saved the
Doha Round of talks from collapse and analyzing the Framework's provisions),
available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File.
65. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, 6 (deciding that, in order to
achieve these substantial reductions, a new agreement will subject higher levels of
permitted trade-distorting domestic support to deeper cuts, mandate that each
developed Member State make a substantial reduction in the overall level of its
trade-distorting support from bound levels, and subject previously permitted de
minimis support to substantial reductions). The General Council decided to
calculate domestic subsidy reduction commitments for each country using a tiered
formula in which Members that spend the most on trade-distorting subsidies will
make the greatest reductions. Id. 7.
66. See id. (providing that during the first year following completion of the
Doha Round, each Member's total trade-distorting domestic support must not
exceed eighty percent of the current levels). A state's "overall" amount of trade-
distorting support is distinct from its Current Total AMS because "overall" support
is the sum of Total AMS plus de minimis levels of trade-distorting support that do
not count as part of a country's Total AMS. Id.; see also Elizabeth Becker, Interim
Trade Triumph Short on Hard Details, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at Cl (observing
that the United States agreed to make a twenty percent reduction in its corn, wheat,
rice, and soybean subsidies), available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Now
Harvest It, supra note 64 (finding that the agreed-upon twenty percent cut may be
misleading because it applies to the total amount of subsidies currently allowed
rather than actual amounts spent).
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must cap trade-distorting support for specific products at their
respective average levels.67 Additionally, a final Doha Round
agreement will mandate substantial reductions in de minimis levels
of trade-distorting subsidies68  and will continue to provide
developing countries special and differential treatment.69
II. ANALYSIS
A. FARM BILL SUBSIDIES LIKELY VIOLATE THE AGREEMENT ON
AGRICULTURE
The Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments likely violate the
Agreement on Agriculture because they are highly trade-distorting
and their amounts are unpredictable.70 In contrast, the Farm Bill's
67. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, 9 (explaining that caps on
product-specific AMS are necessary in order to prevent a country from decreasing
domestic support for some commodities but increasing support for other
commodities).
68. See id. 6, 11 (calling for a reduction in de minimis support as a separate
requirement from reduction in Allowed Total AMS). The Framework exempts
developing countries that distribute de minimis support almost exclusively for
"subsistence and resource-poor farmers" from reduction requirements. Id. 11; see
also Domestic Support Boxes, supra note 44 (explaining that de minimis trade-
distorting support does not count towards Members' Current Total AMS, although
it does contribute to overall totals of trade-distorting domestic support).
69. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, 6 (permitting developing
countries more time to implement mandatory reductions and allowing them to have
more lenient reduction commitments for all types of trade-distorting domestic
support). The Framework also calls for a limit on blue box subsidies, which require
agricultural producers to limit production. See id. $T 6, 13-15 (enumerating that
blue box support may not exceed five percent of a Member State's average total
value of agricultural production during a historical period); see also Domestic
Support Boxes, supra note 44 (explaining that the Agreement on Agriculture does
not limit Member States' spending on blue box subsidies).
70. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (finding that counter-cyclical payments are
highly trade-distorting because they are linked to both a commodity's current
production and its price). Since the total cost of these subsidies over time is
unpredictable, the United States could easily spend more on subsidies than the
Agreement on Agriculture allows. Id. See generally UNDERSTANDING THE WTO,
supra note 10, at 28 (explaining that trade distortion occurs when subsidies
encourage over-production of goods either because the amount of subsidies
distributed are linked to current production levels or to current market prices). In
other words, a subsidy is trade-distorting if it tends to cause farmers to produce
more of a commodity than they otherwise would. Id.
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direct payments are probably not a violation of the Agreement
because they do not appear to be trade-distorting.7
The Agreement on Agriculture allows the United States to spend
up to $19.1 billion on amber box supports per year.7 2 Under the 1996
Freedom to Farm Act, the United States' spending on trade-distorting
subsidies was approximately $10.4 billion per year.73 In contrast, the
Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments increased spending on highly
trade-distorting subsidies by an average of $8.28 billion per year,
making the total amount the United States spends on amber box
subsidies per year dangerously close to the $19.1 billion limit.7 4
1. The Farm Bill's Direct Payments Are Not Trade-Distorting
The Farm Bill's direct payments are probably not trade-distorting
because they do not appear to be dependent on current price or
production levels.75 Because the value of a crop's payment acres
equals a percentage of the amount of acres that the producer planted
at a point in the past, there is no link between payment acres and
71. See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (asserting that the amount of a direct
payment is not dependent on a farmer's current level of production of a commodity
or on the current market price of the commodity).
72. See Zoellick Press Conference, supra note 13.
73. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 456 (finding that the 1996 Freedom to Farm
Act greatly reduced trade-distorting subsidies, cutting the U.S. Total AMS to about
half of its allowable support); see also Gonzalez, supra note 42, at 467 (explaining
that the Freedom to Farm Act replaced trade-distorting subsidies with payments to
producers that were decoupled from prices and production levels).
74. See 148 CONG. REC. S4137 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (revealing that the Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments will cost $82.8
billion over ten years, causing the approximate total of agricultural subsidies over
the next decade to reach approximately $190 billion-an average of $19 billion per
year); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 442 (noting that the Farm Bill caused U.S.
domestic agricultural subsidies to increase by approximately eighty percent);
Sanger, supra note 2 (clarifying that the Farm Bill's agricultural subsidies are in
addition to agricultural subsidies already in place); Brian M. Riedl, Top 10
Reasons to Veto the Farm Bill, at 2 (The Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1538,
2002) (asserting that the Farm Bill will cause the United States to spend
approximately $191 billion over ten years), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Agriculture/ BG1538.cfm (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
75. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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current production levels.76 Similarly, there is no tie between the
payment yield and current production levels because the payment
yield is equal to the amount of the commodity the producer planted
per acre in 1995, as opposed to the most recent crop years.77 Finally,
since the payment rates remain constant rather than fluctuating based
on current market prices, the direct payments are not tied to current
price levels.78
2. The Farm Bill's Counter-Cyclical Payments Are Highly Trade-
Distorting and Likely Violate the Agreement on Agriculture
The Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments are the primary reason
that U.S. agricultural subsidies may violate the Agreement on
Agriculture.79 Counter-cyclical payments are highly trade-distorting
because they differ from direct payments in two important respects:
the payment yield can be "partially updated" to reflect more current
production levels, and the payment rate fluctuates with market prices
rather than remaining constant.8 0
76. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1 101(a)(1), 7
U.S.C.A. § 791 l(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005) (providing that the amount of a crop's
base acres depends on either: (a) the average acreage the farmer planted, or would
have planted between 1998-2001, if it were not for a natural disaster, or (b) the
amount of payment acres the Secretary of Agriculture used to calculate subsidies in
2002). The number of payment acres equals eighty-five percent of the number of
base acres. Id. § 1101(f).
77. See id. § 1102(b). If the farmer did not produce the crop in question in
1995, the Secretary of Agriculture will assign a payment yield to the crop
according to the payment yield for that crop on similar farms in 1995. Id. §
1102(c).
78. See id. § 1103(b) (stating that payment rates for direct payments are set at
specific amounts and do not change depending on current market prices for crops);
see also Griswold, supra note 11 (implying that domestic subsidies with payment
amounts that are not dependent on levels of production and are independent of
market prices do not tend to promote overproduction of covered commodities).
79. See id. § 1104 (establishing that the U.S. government must pay farmers
counter-cyclical payments when the market price for a covered crop falls below the
crop's target price); see also 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002)
(statement of Sen. McConnell) (arguing that the counter-cyclical payments' target
prices constitute price guarantees, which promote overproduction of crops);
Griswold, supra note 11 (citing the international condemnation of the U.S. Farm
Bill).
80. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1104(d) (establishing that
the payment rate for a commodity under the counter-cyclical system depends on
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The fact that an agricultural producer may use payment yields that
are much closer in time to current production levels demonstrates
that counter-cyclical payments are much more closely tied to current
levels of production than are direct payments."1 Where a farmer
receives more subsidies for producing more crops, as he does under
the counter-cyclical payment system, he will be inclined to produce
more than he otherwise would.12 This overproduction saturates world
markets for the crops, causing crop prices to be lower than they
otherwise would be, and stimulates the need for more subsidies to
compensate for the low prices.83
Since the payment rate for counter-cyclical payments changes with
market fluctuations, allowing producers to receive more money as
crop prices decrease, counter-cyclical payments are dependent upon
current market prices.84 The fact that counter-cyclical payments are
market fluctuations and, therefore, is linked to current price levels). Recipients of
counter-cyclical payments may adjust payment yields to reflect more current crop
yields. Id. § 1102(e). See generally supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text
(finding that direct payments are not highly trade-distorting because the payment
rates and payment yields used to calculate the amount of the subsidy are not linked
to current price or production levels).
81. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1102(e)(3) (explaining that
the agricultural producer may choose one of two ways in which to partially update
crop payment yields, both of which take into account the average yields for the
crops during the 1998-2001 crop years). In contrast, the crop yields for direct
payments are based on the crop yields the farmer produced in 1995. Id. § 1102(b).
82. See 148 CONG. REc. S4036 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Corzine) (indicating that the counter-cyclical payments will naturally lead to
overproduction, distorting the world market in agriculture and benefiting only a
limited number of the United States' largest producers); see also Riedl, supra note
74, at 4 (arguing that government subsidies that increase as producers plant more
crops, like the counter-cyclical payments, create overproduction). See generally
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10.
83. See Dangerous Activities, supra note 2 (finding that the Farm Bill invents
new subsidies on a host of farm commodities that depend on prices and production
levels and, therefore, are highly trade-distorting); see also Riedl, supra note 74, at
5 (pointing out that overproduction leads to depressed prices, which causes farmers
to ask for more subsidies); UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10, at 28
(explaining that, where there is a surplus of a commodity on the world market,
prices for that commodity fall, which hurts other producers of that commodity
around the world). But see Sanger, supra note 2 (quoting President Bush as
claiming that the Farm Bill does not encourage overproduction or depress prices).
84. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1104(d) (providing that the
payment rate for counter-cyclical payments is equal to the difference between the
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linked to current crop prices has two important consequences.85 First,
a system that grants farmers more money to produce a crop when
that crop's market price falls effectively constitutes a price-guarantee
for the farmers, which encourages them to produce more of a crop
precisely when they otherwise would produce less.86  This
overproduction naturally causes further depression of that crop's
market price, which hurts producers of the crop globally.87 Second,
counter-cyclical payments often can become unpredictable and
volatile since they are linked to an inherently fluctuating market.88
Although the U.S. Current Total AMS under the Farm Bill may be
crop's effective price and its target price). The payment rate is variable and
dependent on market prices because the effective price of a crop depends on either
the national average market price or the national average marketing assistance loan
rate for the crop. Id. § 1104(b). As a crop's market price decreases in value, the
difference between the market price and target price specified in the Farm Bill
must increase, thereby increasing the amount of the subsidy that the Secretary of
Agriculture must pay to the crop's producers. Id. § 1 104(a)-(d).
85. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (showing that counter-
cyclical payments cause trade distortion and unpredictable subsidy payments).
86. See 148 CONG. REc. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
McConnell) (arguing that the counter-cyclical payments' "target prices" function
as agricultural producers' price guarantees). Senator McConnell pointed out that
guaranteeing payments on crops logically encourages farmers to overproduce those
crops. Id.; see also Griswold, supra note 11 ("In a normal market, supply would
contract when prices fall, but the farm bill is explicitly written to keep farmland in
production even when the market is sending the opposite signal."); Kreuzhuber,
supra note 6, at 3 (contending that when subsidies guarantee a given level of
income, farmers have no incentive to follow market signals).
87. See 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Bunning) (warning that the overproduction incentives in the Farm Bill will cause
the prices of those commodities to fall). The decrease in prices of the commodities
on the global market will have an adverse economic affect on other nations,
especially developing nations. Id. at S4036 (statement of Sen. Corzine); see also
Griswold, supra note 11 (maintaining that overproduction resulting from price
guarantees leads to depression in global prices, which particularly hurts farmers in
third world countries).
88. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 11 04(a)-(d) (illustrating
that, because market prices are unpredictable and the distribution of counter-
cyclical payments is mandatory, the amount of subsidies the U.S. government must
distribute to producers under the counter-cyclical system is also unpredictable); see
also Johnson, supra note 5, at 457 (suggesting that the United States could fail to
keep Farm Bill subsidies within the U.S. Allowed Total AMS).
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just under $19.1 billion in theory,89 the reality is that counter-cyclical
payments potentially could expand, causing the U.S. government to
spend more than it anticipated on trade-distorting subsidies and,
therefore, breach the Agreement on Agriculture.9" Members of
Congress were correct to warn that because the subsidies are linked
to current prices, they cause trade distortion and easily could result in
a breach of U.S. obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture. 91
The Bush Administration incorrectly asserts that the Farm Bill
does not adversely affect world trade in agriculture or violate the
Agreement on Agriculture.92 The White House reasons that the
counter-cyclical payments are in accordance with the Agreement on
Agriculture because the Farm Bill contains a provision allowing the
Secretary of Agriculture to adjust the amount of subsidies
distributed, "to the maximum extent practicable," if the Secretary
determines that U.S. expenditures on subsidies may rise above the
89. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that under the Farm
Bill, U.S. spending on amber box subsidies is dangerously close to the $19.1
billion annual limit).
90. See 148 CONG. REc. S4137 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (pointing out that, despite the Farm Bill's theoretical compliance with the
Agreement on Agriculture, the Farm Bill will breach the Agreement because it
provides for "expanded and unpredictable levels of support"); see also Kreuzhuber,
supra note 6, at 5 (noting that spending on counter-cyclical payments is
unpredictable and likely will be higher than estimated).
91. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. S4137 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (asserting that the counter-cyclical payments will encourage
overproduction, which will drive down prices, which leads to more subsidies, and
this may cause the United States to breach the Agreement on Agriculture); 148
CONG. REC. S4030 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. McConnell)
(contending that the Farm Bill "probably violates our trade agreements"). Senator
Corzine predicts that the Farm Bill's counter-cyclical subsidies will undermine
U.S. agricultural trade policy by driving down global crop prices. Id. at S4036.
92. See Sanger, supra note 2 (reporting that President Bush contends that the
Farm Bill functions as a safety net for farmers without encouraging overproduction
or depressing global prices in agriculture); see also President Signs Farm Bill,
supra note 34 (claiming that the Farm Bill reduces government interference in the
agricultural market, supports the U.S. government's commitment to open trade,
and complies with U.S. obligations under the WTO); supra notes 79-91 and
accompanying text (explaining that because counter-cyclical payments are tied to
price and production levels and are unpredictable, they could cause the United
States to breach the Agreement on Agriculture).
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U.S. Allowed Total AMS.93 The Administration's claims are
misguided because the costs of the counter-cyclical payments are
difficult to forecast and market downturns could cause the amount of
subsidies the USDA is required to allocate to rise beyond predicted
levels despite the Secretary's theoretical power to decrease subsidies
in anticipation of a breach.94 Moreover, the fact that Congress found
it necessary to include a provision in the Farm Bill regarding the
Secretary's powers in the event of a U.S. breach of the Agreement on
Agriculture illustrates the likelihood that such a breach could occur
under the Bill. 95
B. FARM BILL SUBSIDIES LIKELY VIOLATE THE SCM AGREEMENT
In addition to violating the Agreement on Agriculture, the Farm
Bill's counter-cyclical payments likely violate the SCM
Agreement. 96 The DSB Panel report on U.S. subsidies on upland
cotton illustrates the WTO's position that at least some counter-
cyclical payments cause significant price suppression and, therefore,
93. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1601(e)(1) (stating that if
the Secretary of Agriculture determines that Farm Bill subsidies may exceed
permitted levels, the Secretary may, "to the maximum extent practicable," adjust
the amount of subsidies distributed so that they do not exceed such allowable
levels); see also White House, Policies in Focus: More Information on the Farm
Bill (alleging that the Farm Bill contains a "circuit breaker" that is meant to ensure
U.S. compliance with the Agreement on Agriculture), at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/infocus/farminfo/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
94. See Dangerous Activities, supra note 2 (relaying that European countries
thought that, despite the Farm Bill's clause allowing the Secretary to cut subsidies
if they rise too high, the United States likely will breach the Agreement on
Agriculture); see also Kreuzhuber, supra note 6 (maintaining that the costs of
counter-cyclical payments are difficult to predict and could easily result in
exceeding the allowed limit, despite the Secretary's power to reduce payments if
necessary).
95. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1601(e)(1) (allowing the
Secretary of Agriculture to cut Farm Bill subsidies if they rise at unpredictable
levels and cause U.S. subsidies to rise beyond the allowable limit).
96. See SCM Agreement, supra note 14, art. 5(c) (forbidding any Member
State from distributing subsidies that "serious[ly] prejudice" other Members). A
subsidy causes "serious prejudice" if it results in significant price suppression or
depression of a commodity in international markets. Id. art. 6.3(c); see also supra
Part II.A.2 (explaining that counter-cyclical payments cause overproduction and,
therefore, price depression in world markets).
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trade-distortion in the world market. 97 As cotton is just one of the
covered commodities in the Farm Bill, it is likely that WTO
Members could successfully challenge the legality of U.S. counter-
cyclical payments on other crops.98 Therefore, the DSB Panel's
decision logically permits the conclusion that counter-cyclical
payments on other crops, in addition to cotton, likely cause serious
prejudice to the interests of other countries and violate the SCM
Agreement.99
C. THE FARM BILL IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE
GENEVA FRAMEWORK
Prior to the Farm Bill, U.S. spending on trade-distorting subsidies
constituted only a fraction of the total amount of support that the
97. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 349 (finding
that U.S. counter-cyclical cotton subsidies violate the SCM Agreement because
they cause price suppression in world markets and thereby seriously prejudice
Brazil's interests). The Panel mandated that the United States correct their adverse
effects or remove them. Id. at 350-51. But see Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Dispelling Myths About U.S. Support to Cotton Farmers: U.S.
Programs Have Not Caused Low Cotton Prices and Hurt Foreign Growers 1-4
(Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter Dispelling Myths] (disputing the DSB Panel's finding
that counter-cyclical payments caused significant price suppression in the world
cotton market from 1999-2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets
/DocumentLibrary/Fact Sheets/2004/asset_upload-file784_6153.pdf (last visited
Sept. 9, 2005). Former U.S. Trade Representative Zoellick asserted that although
Brazil and other countries alleged that the Farm Bill increases domestic support to
U.S. farmers, which in turn depresses prices and distorts trade, world cotton prices
have actually increased since the passage of the Farm Bill. Id. at 1-2. Zoellick cited
three studies that claim that the elimination of certain U.S. domestic subsidies
would result in only a small increase in cotton prices. Id. at 2-3. However, Zoellick
admitted that the United States takes issue with "important conceptual and
methodological aspects" of the studies he cited. Id. at 3.
98. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1104(c) (showing that the
government must make counter-cyclical payments to upland cotton producers); see
also Elizabeth Becker, Lawmakers Voice Doom and Gloom on W.TO. Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at Cl (commenting that the WTO ruling "calls into
question" the Farm Bill because the Bill increased subsidies for many commodity
crops in addition to cotton), available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File;
Unpicking Cotton Subsidies, supra note 55 (suggesting that the WTO also could
find that U.S. barley or corn subsidies violate WTO agreements).
99. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 347-50
(suggesting that counter-cyclical subsidies may violate the SCM Agreement by
virtue of their generally trade-distorting effects in world agricultural markets).
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Agreement on Agriculture allows the United States to spend. 00
Under the Farm Bill, however, the U.S. Current Total AMS has
nearly reached the allowed limit of $19.1 billion, and this figure does
not take into account the market fluctuations that potentially could
push subsidies above the $19.1 billion ceiling. 0 1 Due to its effect of
dramatically increasing U.S. trade-distorting subsidies, the Farm Bill
has been a major obstruction to WTO Member States achieving
consensus in the Doha Round. 0
1. The Farm Bill Cannot Conform to the Geneva Framework
Provision Calling for a Twenty Percent Cut in Overall U.S. Trade-
Distorting Agricultural Subsidies
Under the Geneva Framework, the United States promised to cut
its allowable limit on overall trade-distorting agricultural subsidies
by twenty percent during the first year following passage of a final
Doha agreement.103 Since U.S. spending is close to the limit of
allowed support, implementation of a new WTO agreement cutting
100. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 456 (indicating that under the Freedom to
Farm Act, the U.S. Current Total AMS was approximately $10.4 billion per year,
which is well under the $19.1 billion allowed amount); see also Nelson, supra note
5, at 32.
101. See 148 CONG. REc. S4137 (daily ed. May 9, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Specter) (predicting that the Farm Bill will cause the total amount of agricultural
subsidies over the next decade to reach an average of $19 billion per year); see also
supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining that the amount of subsidies the
U.S. government must distribute to producers under the counter-cyclical system is
unpredictable).
102. See Altman, supra note 12 (explaining that the Director General of the
WTO, Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, found that the Farm Bill, by increasing U.S.
subsidies, was hampering the Doha Round trade talks); see also Sanger, supra note
2 (quoting the director of the University of Maryland's Center for Security and
Economic Policy as saying that, prior to the passage of the Farm Bill, "Europeans
will feel that they are no longer the stand-out sinners" and that "[t]he Japanese will
feel relieved, and it's hard to imagine how it would be possible to negotiate a new
global agreement"); Becker, supra note 98 (finding that former U.S. Trade
Representative Zoellick contributed to the breakdown of Doha Round trade talks in
Cancun by refusing to cut agricultural subsidies and insisting on preserving the
Farm Bill); The WTO Under Fire, supra note 17 (citing the Farm Bill's dramatic
increase in domestic subsidies and the United States' refusal to reduce cotton
subsidies at the WTO negotiations in Cancun as contributing to the stagnation of
the Doha Round talks).
103. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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allowable support by twenty percent would require the United States
to immediately and drastically reduce the amount it spends on
subsidies to prevent breach of the new agreement. °n Only if the U.S.
Trade Representative could persuade the WTO to reclassify the Farm
Bill's counter-cyclical payments as blue box subsidies, instead of
amber box subsidies, could the Bill possibly survive a new WTO
agreement.105
Former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick incorrectly
contended that counter-cyclical payments do not count toward amber
box limits because they are linked only to price and not to
production.10 6 First, the fact that the subsidies fluctuate based on
price, regardless of whether they relate to production levels, is
enough to make them trade-distorting.107 Second, Zoellick's premise
that there is no link between counter-cyclical payments and current
production levels depends on an illusory distinction between using
crop yields from 1998-2001 to determine the amount of a counter-
cyclical payment and using the crop yield only from the most recent
year.108 Farmers likely will expect crop yields to continue to be
104. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, 7 (calling for a twenty percent
reduction in total allowable AMS for each Member State). Since a twenty percent
reduction in overall permitted subsidies under the Geneva Framework would
entitle the United States to spend only $15.28 billion per year, subsidies costing
$19 billion per year clearly would violate the Framework. Id.; see also supra note
74 and accompanying text.
105. See Zoellick Press Conference, supra note 13 (revealing that former U.S.
Trade Representative Zoellick tried to induce the WTO to reclassify counter-
cyclical payments as blue box instead of amber box subsidies so that they will not
count towards U.S. Current Total AMS). Zoellick made clear to many WTO
Members that this is a key point for the United States in reaching a Doha Round
agreement. Id.
106. See Zoellick Press Conference, supra note 13 (conceding that the WTO has
not endorsed the idea of allowing counter-cyclical payments to be considered blue
box instead of amber box subsidies). Zoellick claimed that counter-cyclical
payments are "basically" no longer linked to production. Id.; see also Dispelling
Myths, supra note 97, at 9 (illustrating Zoellick's claim that the Farm Bill's
payments to cotton farmers are tied only to price).
107. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (explaining that because
counter-cyclical payments are linked to current crop prices, they guarantee
producers certain prices for their crops and, consequently, cause over-production
and trade-distortion).
108. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 § 1102(e), 7 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7912(e) (West Supp. 2005) (utilizing the crop years 1998-2001 instead of the
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updated and will have an incentive to overproduce because of the
anticipation of receiving a certain amount of money per unit of crop
produced.109 If there were any doubt as to the proper characterization
of counter-cyclical payments, the WTO's recent ruling that U.S.
subsidies to cotton farmers are prejudicial to other Member States
clarifies the WTO's judgment that counter-cyclical payments are
highly trade-distorting and count toward amber box limits.I10
Leaving the counter-cyclical payment system intact would force
the United States to breach the Geneva Framework requirement that
U.S. Current Total AMS be less than $15.28 billion per year (twenty
percent less than the current limit of $19.1 billion)."' The Secretary
of Agriculture could utilize the provision allowing the USDA to
reduce subsidies as deemed necessary, but the provision's purpose
probably was to allow the Secretary to correct small increases in the
counter-cyclical payments due to market fluctuations, not to
implement an entirely new WTO agreement. 12 Thus, Congress likely
crop year of 1995, which is used for calculating direct payments, resulting in
counter-cyclical payments tied to more recent production levels); see also
Kreuzhuber, supra note 6, at 2 (asserting that when the Farm Bill allows updated
crop yields, the subsidies effectively re-couple to production levels).
109. See 148 CONG. REc. S4036 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Corzine) (contending that the counter-cyclical payments will naturally lead to
overproduction because they are proportional to production levels); see also
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 10, at 28 (explaining that overproduction
will result when the amount of government subsidies paid to farmers depends on
the amount of crops the farmers produce); Kreuzhuber, supra note 6, at 2
(contending that farmers receiving counter-cyclical payments likely assume that
the U.S. government will allow future updating of crops, which encourages
overproduction).
110. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 347-50
(implying that since the counter-cyclical payments to cotton producers are highly
trade-distorting, the government must consider them amber box subsidies and
count them towards U.S. Allowed Total AMS).
111. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, 7 (requiring each Member to
reduce its total trade-distorting domestic support to equal to or less than eighty
percent of the currently permitted levels).
112. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1601(3) (indicating that the
Secretary of Agriculture has the power to decrease the amount of subsidies he or
she distributes to prevent the United States from providing support in excess of
allowable levels). The statutory language does not indicate that Congress meant
this provision to apply to a situation where the Secretary must drastically change
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would have to repeal or drastically amend the Farm Bill in order to
reduce the overall amount the United States spends on trade-
distorting subsidies.113
2. The Farm Bill Cannot Coexist with the Geneva Framework
Requirement that Member States Cap Trade-Distorting Support for
Specific Products at Average Respective Levels
The Farm Bill does not set any limit on the amount of subsidies
that the government may distribute to the producers of any particular
commodity. 1 4 However, the Geneva Framework specifies that
Members must impose limits on the amount of subsidies they
distribute for the production of specific commodities. 5 The recent
WTO ruling on U.S. cotton subsidies illustrates the WTO's belief
that a country can distribute too many subsidies to producers of any
one commodity so as to distort world trade in that commodity." 6
Since the Farm Bill does not limit trade-distorting counter-cyclical
payments in any way, it could not survive a new Doha agreement
that calls for caps on product-specific support. 11 7
subsidy allocation to force the United States to comply with a new WTO
agreement. Id.
113. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
114. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act §§ 1103-1104 (lacking any
mention of limitations of direct or counter-cyclical payments); see also
Kreuzhuber, supra note 6, at 4 (indicating that there are virtually no limits on the
amount of payments that any one producer may receive under the Farm Bill); see
also supra note 3 and accompanying text (contrasting the Farm Bill with the 1996
Freedom to Farm Act, the latter of which specified payment limitations on
domestic agricultural subsidies).
115. See Geneva Framework, supra note 19, 9 (capping product-specific
AMSs at their respective average levels in order "[t]o prevent circumvention of the
objective of the Agreement through transfers of unchanged domestic support
between different support categories").
116. See WTO Report on U.S. Cotton Subsidies, supra note 15, at 349.
117. Compare Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1104 (demonstrating
that there is no limit imposed on the amount of counter-cyclical payments that may
be distributed to producers of any one commodity), with Geneva Framework,
supra note 19, 9 (providing that Member States must impose product-specific
caps on domestic support spending).
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II. RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress should repeal the Farm Bill and enact an agriculture bill
that embraces free trade principles to remedy U.S. violations of the
Agreement on Agriculture and to ensure that the United States will
comply with a new Doha Round agreement on agriculture. 18 In its
stead, Congress should enact a farm bill that rewards subsidies on the
basis of conservation and environmental practices and, therefore, is
not trade-distorting. 
119
A. CONGRESS SHOULD REPEAL THE FARM BILL OF 2002
The Farm Bill cannot legally co-exist with U.S. obligations under
the Agreement on Agriculture or potential obligations under a new
WTO agreement as outlined by the Geneva Framework, and it
contravenes sound domestic and international agricultural policy.
First, Congress should repeal the Farm Bill because the counter-
cyclical payments violate the Agreement on Agriculture.121 Second,
the Farm Bill is hampering Doha Round negotiations and continues
to pose a threat to their completion. 121 Third, the Farm Bill is
inconsistent with the promises made in the Geneva Framework and
could not co-exist with a final Doha Round agreement on
agriculture. 22 Fourth, subsidies under the Farm Bill cause
overproduction and drive down crop prices, thereby adversely
affecting the economies of many other countries, especially
118. See discussion infra Part III.A (finding that Congress should repeal the
Farm Bill because it violates WTO Agreements and constitutes poor domestic and
international policy).
119. See discussion infra Part III.B.
120. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating how counter-cyclical
payments cause price depression in world markets and easily could cause U.S.
expenditures on agricultural subsidies to rise above the amount allowed by the
Agreement on Agriculture).
121. See World Trade Talks: A Step Forward, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2004
(warning that the Doha Round will fail unless the President makes reaching a final
agreement a top priority), available at 2004 WLNR 10895744.
122. See id. (maintaining that the Geneva Framework "ought to force changes to
America's grotesque farm subsidies"); see also discussion supra Part II.B
(explaining the reasons why the counter-cyclical payments could not conform to
the Geneva Framework).
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developing nations.1 23 In contrast, world agricultural markets that are
unencumbered by trade-distorting subsidies combat poverty and help
developing countries' economies. 124 Fifth, the Farm Bill could
undermine U.S. trade policy by causing countries to be less inclined
to open their markets to U.S. producers.125
Lastly, the Farm Bill's trade-distorting domestic subsidies actually
hurt smaller, family-owned farms in the long run.126 There is a
123. See 148 CONG. REc. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Bunning) (maintaining that the Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments will lead to
overproduction of subsidized crops, which will cause world prices of those
commodities to fall). Senator Corzine explained that when a government
encourages the overproduction of a commodity, world prices for the commodity
fall, which adversely affects producers of that commodity around the world. Id. at
S4036; see also Griswold, supra note 11 (maintaining that the Farm Bill hurts the
farmers of the world's poorest countries). See generally Trade: Sour Subsidies,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004 ("Rich-country farm subsidies prevent the poorest
countries from selling some of the only goods, other than illegal drugs, that they
are able to export."), available at 2004 WLNR 6512297; supra notes 79-83 and
accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Jeffrey Schott, Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003 (reporting that least developed countries could benefit
substantially from freer trade with the United States), available at LEXIS, News
Library, ECON File; Harvesting Poverty: The Unkept Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
30, 2003, at A20 (reporting that there is a consensus among multilateral economic
and development agencies that rich nations' farm subsidies hurt the economies of
developing countries), available at 2003 WLNR 5242870. The World Bank
predicts that "an end to trade-distorting farm subsidies and tariffs could expand
global wealth by as much as a half-trillion dollars and lift 150 million people out of
poverty by 2015." Id. But see, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 42, at 435-37 (arguing
that free trade does not promote economic prosperity in developing countries);
Nothing to Sell, ECONOMIST, May 27, 2004 (explaining that the problem with free
trade is that it is not much use to a developing country if it is so poor that it has
nothing to sell), available at 2004 WLNR 15299002.
125. See 148 CONG. REC. S4036 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Corzine) (expressing concern that developing countries hurt by U.S. subsidies may
be less likely to open their markets to American companies); see also Griswold,
supra note 11 (quoting an E.U. official as saying that the U.S. Farm Bill hurts the
United States' credibility and negotiating power in WTO meetings).
126. See 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
McConnell) (noting that the legislation will end up benefiting the largest farms
because the more a farmer can produce, the more payments he will receive under
the Farm Bill); see also Congress at the Trough, supra note 6, at 14 (pointing out
that the irony in the Farm Bill is that it actually works a "terrible disservice" to
farmers). Price depression that results from overproduction of crops can lead to
political pressure to help farmers by instituting more subsidies, thereby
1242
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general consensus that the U.S. government distributes two-thirds of
Farm Bill subsidies to only ten percent of U.S. farms, causing the
Bill to favor large farm conglomerates. 127 Many Senators from states
with significant farming constituencies voted against the Farm Bill
because they correctly believe that domestic subsidies cause
overproduction of crops, depressing prices and leading to a cycle of
continuing subsidies and overproduction. 28 This hurts agricultural
producers--especially small, family-owned farms.
129
B. CONGRESS SHOULD IMPLEMENT A NEW FARM BILL BASED ON
FREE TRADE PRINCIPLES AND IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA
FRAMEWORK
A new farm bill should not subsidize U.S. farmers based on the
types of crops planted, the amount of crops produced, or the current
perpetuating a cycle of overproduction, price depression and increasing subsidies.
Id.
127. See 148 CONG. REc. S4028 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Bunning) (noting that this disparity in distributions will further "contribute to the
decline of the family farm" and take focus away from those who need help the
most); see also Riedl, supra note 74, at 3 (highlighting that the largest
agribusinesses receive the largest subsidies because they produce the most crops).
Additionally, because the Farm Bill awards subsidies to individuals as opposed to
farms, large farm conglomerates can sign up every employee to receive subsidies.
Id.
128. See S. Res. 103, 107th Cong. (2002) (showing that Senators from Arizona,
Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming voted against the Bill). The Farm Bill
passed the Senate 64 to 35, with one Senator absent. Id.; see also 148 CONG. REC.
S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bunning).
129. See 148 CONG. REc. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement on Sen.
McConnell) (concluding that the Farm Bill will not help the vast majority of
Kentucky farmers but instead will help the wealthy, corporate farms). Senator
McConnell thought that the "winners" of the Farm Bill include large farm
conglomerates that are eligible for almost unlimited subsidies, and the "losers"
include small, family farms as well as U.S. taxpayers, who must pay higher prices
for produce. Id. See generally Brian M. Riedl, Agriculture Lobby Wins Big in New
Farm Bill (The Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1534, 2002) (finding that the
Farm Bill is more like corporate welfare than income support for struggling,
family-owned farms, and providing statistics on Fortune 500 companies, members
of Congress, and other wealthy individuals and entities receiving extremely large
payments under the Farm Bill), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Agriculture/BG1534.cfin (last visited Sept. 9, 2005).
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market prices of the crops,13° but rather should grant subsidies to
farmers based on their compliance with conservation and other
environmental programs.' The Farm Bill specifies that direct and
counter-cyclical payments are contingent on a farmer's promise to
abide by certain environmental requirements,3 2 and the Conservation
Security Program in the Bill subsidizes farmers who agree to
implement certain conservation programs.133  However, these
conservation programs are optional as opposed to mandatory. 134 In a
new farm bill, conservation incentives should be the only factor
relevant in determining whether a producer receives subsidies from
the government. 35
130. Cf Farm Security and Rural Investment Act §§ 1103-1104 (allocating
current subsidies based on the type of crop produced, the amount of production,
and, in the case of counter-cyclical payments, the market prices of the crops).
131. See 150 CONG. REc. S 11276, S11278 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2004) (statement
of Sen. Harkin) (remarking that the large agricultural producers tend to benefit
most under the Farm Bill and that the Bill's Conservation Security Program is a
step in the right direction toward linking subsidies with environmental and
conservational programs). Senator Harkin criticized President Bush for claiming to
support conservation programs but advocating the reduction of available
conservation funds to combat environmental emergencies. Id. at S 11278-79; see
also Becker, supra note 66, at C2 (reporting that Pascal Lamy, the E.U. Trade
Commissioner, urged the United States to follow the E.U.'s lead in granting
subsidies to reward farmers for protecting the environment rather than for
producing commodities).
132. See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act § 1 105(a)(1)(A)-(C)
(indicating that in order to receive subsidies under the Farm Bill, agricultural
producers must agree to comply with certain conservation, wetland protection, and
planting flexibility requirements). Additionally, farmers must use the land for an
agricultural or conservational purpose and must keep the land in good condition.
Id. § 1 105(a)(1)(D)-(E).
133. See id. § 1238A(b)(1) (stating that to be eligible for the Conservation
Security Program, a farmer must submit and obtain approval of a conservation
security plan). The farmer must enter into a conservation security contract with the
Secretary to carry out the plan. Id.
134. See id. § 1238B-C(b) (explaining that if the producer abides by the
contract, the Secretary will make annual payments to cover implementation costs
and will reward conservation efforts).
135. See Becker, supra note 66, at C2 (commenting that the E.U. Trade
Commissioner believes that the United States may have to change its agriculture
policy to award subsidies for conservation efforts in order to comply with WTO
obligations); see also -Farm Subsidies: Last of the Summer Whine?, ECONOMIST,
Aug. 21, 2004 (praising Britain's implementation of a new agriculture policy in
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An example of an agriculture program that aims to allocate
subsidies independently from crop production and price levels is the
E.U.'s recently reformed Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). 13 6
The reformed CAP provides for a "single farm payment" in which
farmers receive subsidies in the form of a flat rate per unit of land so
long as the farmers keep their land in good agricultural and
environmental condition and abide by certain other regulations, such
as food safety and animal welfare laws.I37
With this model in mind, Congress should abolish those subsidies
with amounts depending on price and production levels--counter-
cyclical payments-for the numerous reasons articulated in this
Comment. 38 Direct payments should continue, but not as they exist
under the current Farm Bill.139 The USDA should not allocate direct
payments to farmers based on the amount of crop they produced in
any year or combination of years, but rather should distribute a
certain amount of money per acre of land to those producers who
comply with certain conservational and environmental
requirements.1 40 If this were the case, domestic subsidies to U.S.
which subsidies depend on farmers' compliance with environmental policies),
available at 2004 WLNR 10889818.
136. See European Union, CAP Reform - A Long-Term Perspective for
Sustainable Agriculture [hereinafter CAP Reform] (noting that E.U. farm ministers
adopted a dramatic reform to the CAP on June 26, 2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/capreform/indexen.htm (last visited
Sept. 9, 2005). According to the reformed CAP, the vast majority of domestic
agriculture subsidies that the E.U. allocates will not be tied to production levels. Id.
137. See id.; see also Last of the Summer Whine?, supra note 135 (noting that
Britain was scheduled to implement E.U. reforms beginning on January 1, 2005,
by subsidizing English farms according to a flat rate per hectare).
138. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating that counter-cyclical
payments are highly trade-distorting); see also discussion supra Part III.A (citing
the adverse social and political repercussions of counter-cyclical payments). See
generally discussion supra Part 1I (finding that the counter-cyclical payments
cause the United States to breach the Agreement on Agriculture and likely will
violate a new WTO agreement).
139. See discussion supra Part I.A.1 (explaining how the Farm Bill's direct
payment system works); see also discussion supra Part II.A.1 (noting that the
direct payments are not trade-distorting even though the Secretary of Agriculture
calculates their amounts according to production levels at some point in the past).
140. See CAP Reform, supra note 136 (explaining that the single-farm payment
method will enable farmers to receive subsidies from the government based on a
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farmers would not cause trade-distortion and would assist America's
farmers while providing the government and taxpayers with the
benefit of improved environmental conditions on U.S. farmland. 141
The E.U. expects CAP reform to cause European farmers to
become more competitive and market-oriented while still benefiting
from income stability. 142 A new U.S. farm bill that mirrors the CAP
reform by excluding subsidies linked to production and price levels
and instituting those dependent on environmentally sound practices
would ensure a U.S. agricultural policy based on a free-market
philosophy and in conformity with WTO agreements. 143
CONCLUSION
The United States was moving in the direction of promoting free
trade in agriculture until Congress passed the Farm Bill in May of
flat rate per unit of land in exchange for keeping their land in good agricultural and
environmental condition).
141. See id. (implying that the new CAP system will provide necessary aid to
E.U. farmers and will have the advantage of simultaneously improving the
environmental condition of farmland).
142. See id. (finding that the E.U. reforms will enable farmers to produce
according to market demands and will also strengthen the E.U.'s negotiating
powers in formulating a new WTO agreement on agriculture).
143. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 5, Annex 2 (providing that
subsidies not tied to current production or price levels, which include subsidies
through environmental protection programs, or green box subsidies, are not subject
to reduction commitments); see also Domestic Support Boxes, supra note 44
(clarifying that payments allocated through conservational or other environmental
programs are green box subsidies); DAVID DANA, WTO LEGAL IMPACTS ON
COMMODITY SUBSIDIES: GREEN Box OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FARM BILL FOR FARM
INCOME THROUGH THE CONSERVATION AND CLEAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS 1 (Envtl. L. & Pol'y Center, 2004) (contending that the Farm Bill's
subsidies rewarding farmers for conservation efforts are likely green box
subsidies), available at http://www.elpc.org/energy/WTO.Farm%2OBill%
20Paper.July%2020.2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2005). Since the current
Agreement on Agriculture labels payments linked to environmental programs as
green box subsidies, similar payments in a new farm bill likely would have the
same classification. Id.; see also CAP Reform, supra note 136 (contending that an
agricultural policy that rewards farmers for environmental and conservational
efforts but not for amounts of crop produced results in a free-market agricultural
economy). An environmentally-driven policy likely would prevent a Member State
from breaching WTO subsidy reduction commitments. Id.
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2002.1' The Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments puts the United
States at risk of spending more than the $19.1 billion per year limit
imposed by the Agreement on Agriculture. 45 These subsidies also
are likely to cause serious prejudice to other Members' interests and
therefore violate the SCM Agreement.'46 Additionally, the Farm Bill
has been a large factor in delaying the completion of Doha Round
negotiations and almost certainly could not comport with a final
Doha Round agreement. 47 Congress should repeal the Farm Bill and,
in its place, enact legislation that reflects a commitment to free trade
principles and awards subsidies to farmers for conservation measures
rather than for the overproduction of commodities.
48
POSTSCRIPT
Since this comment was accepted for publication, several
significant events relating to U.S. agriculture subsidies and the WTO
have occurred. First, in April of 2005, the U.S. Congress passed a
resolution regarding the 2006 federal budget that included a pledge
to cut spending on agriculture by $3 billion over the next five
years. 49 Second, the WTO has scheduled its next Ministerial
144. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (explaining how the 1996
Freedom to Farm Act reduced U.S. trade-distorting subsidies, but the Farm Bill
expanded them and created new ones).
145. See Zoellick Press Conference, supra note 13; see also discussion supra
Part II.A.2 (contending that the Farm Bill's counter-cyclical payments are highly
trade-distorting and likely will cause the United States to breach its obligations
under the Agreement on Agriculture).
146. See supra Parts I.C, II.B (describing the DSB Panel's ruling that counter-
cyclical payments to cotton producers under the Farm Bill violate the SCM
Agreement and concluding that counter-cyclical payments in general likely cause
serious prejudice to other countries' interests because of their significant trade-
distorting effects).
147. See supra Part II.C (maintaining that the counter-cyclical subsidies in the
Farm Bill almost certainly violate the Geneva Framework, which calls for a twenty
percent reduction of the U.S. Allowed Total AMS).
148. See supra Part III (recommending that the United States institute an
agriculture law similar to the reformed CAP, which provides income stability to
farmers by way of rewarding them for their environmental and conservational
practices).
149. See Congress Cuts $3 Billion in Agriculture Spending, AMERICAN FARM
BUREAU, May 2, 2005 (specifying that a cut of $173 million would occur in the
first year of implementation of the resolution), available at http://www.fb.org/
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Conference for December 13-18, 2005, during which the Member
States will have an opportunity to ratify a new agreement on
agriculture. 150 Third, on October 10, 2005, U.S. Trade Representative
Rob Portman announced that, in light of the upcoming WTO
negotiations, the United States is pledging to cut its Total AMS
(amber box subsidies) by sixty percent over a five-year period.151 It is
unclear whether the U.S. Trade Representative's proposal intends the
reduction to apply to Current Total AMS or Allowed Total AMS,
and the proposal does not specify what percentage of the cut would
be made during the first year or how the United States would achieve
this cut. 5 2
The proposal is consistent with this comment's assertion that the
United States must substantially cut domestic trade-distorting
subsidies to make a new WTO agreement on agriculture possible.'53
If, as this comment contends, the Farm Bill causes the United States
to spend approximately $19 billion per year on amber box subsidies,
implementing a sixty percent reduction over five years (assuming the
reduction would be made in equal proportions each year) would
news/fbn/05/05_02/html/congress.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). However, the
Senate omitted this cut from the spending bill it passed on September 22, 2005,
and the agriculture committees are expected to decide in the near future how to
implement this cut. Senate Passes $1 0OB Agriculture, Drug Bill, Fox NEWS, Sept.
22, 2005, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,170155,00.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2005).
150. See World Trade Org., The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference (noting that
the meeting will take place in Hong Kong, China), at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/ministe/min05_e/min05_e.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
151. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Proposal for WTO
Agriculture Negotiations (Oct. 10, 2005) (outlining a U.S. proposal regarding all
three aspects of WTO agriculture negotiations: domestic subsidies, market access,
and export competition), available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeSectors/
Agriculture/USProposal forWTOAgricultureNegotiations.html (last visited
Oct. 10, 2005). The proposal specifies that the United States will cut spending on
amber box subsidies by sixty percent if Member States that spend over $25 billion
per year on amber box subsidies will cut their spending by eighty-three percent.
Id.
152. Id. But see To Doha's Rescue, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2005 (contending that
the cuts in the U.S. proposal refer to reductions on allowable limits rather than on
current amounts spent).
153. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining that the Farm Bill
has impeded the progress of WTO Doha Round agriculture negotiations).
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result in a cut of approximately $2.28 billion during the first year.154
Thus, the U.S. Trade Representative's proposal, if implemented,
would be a step in the right direction, but Congress would have to
drastically amend or repeal the Farm Bill of 2002 to achieve the
proposal's goals.1 5
5
154. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the USDA
spends approximately $19 billion per year on trade-distorting subsidies). If the
U.S. proposal's cut is applied to the U.S. Allowed Total AMS of $19.1 billion, the
resulting cut would be approximately $2.29 billion per year. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. The U.S. Trade Representative's proposal may not be entirely
consistent with Congress' pledge because the budget cut would decrease spending
on agriculture subsidies by only $173 million in 2006. See Congress Cuts $3
Billion in Agriculture Spending, supra note 149.
155. See discussion supra Part II.C. 1 (explaining that the Farm Bill would not be
able to survive the twenty percent cut in amber box subsidies that the Geneva
Framework mandates).
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